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PUBLIC CHOICE REVISITED

Daniel A. Farber*
and
Philip P. Frickey**
PUBLIC CHOICE AND PUBLIC LAW: READINGS AND COMMENTARY.
By Maxwell L. Steams. Cincinnati: Anderson Publishing Co. 1997.
Pp. xxxvii, 1035. $54.95.
Although not the first book on public choice_ for a legal audi
ence,1 Max Stearns's Public Choice and Public Law2 is the first full
scale textbook for law school use.3 An ambitious undertaking by a
rising young scholar, the book provides law students with a compre
hensive introduction to public choice.
_

Public choice - essentially, the application of economic reason
ing to political institutions - has become a significant aspect of
public law scholarship. Indeed, in his Foreword, Saul Levmore
hails public choice as " [t]he most exciting intellectual development
in law schools in the last decade" (p. xi). Be that as it may, the
publication of the first textbook surely marks an important stage in
the development of a subject. It is an apt occasion to evaluate the
ways in which public choice can best contribute to legal education
and scholarship.
Our goal in this review, consequently, is not merely to assess the
Stearns book, but to see what light it sheds on this broader ques
tion. In Part I of the review, we accompany Steams on a tour of
public choice and public law. The book provides a good cross sec
tion of the major writings of legal scholars interested in public
choice. For readers familiar with the field, Part I provides an op* Henry J. Fletcher Professor of Law and Associate Dean, University of Minnesota.
B.A. 1971, M.A. 1972, J.D. 1975, Illinois. - Ed. We received useful comments from partici
pants at the Harvard Law and Economics Workshop.
** Faegre & Benson Professor of Law, University of Minnesota. B.A. 1975, Kansas; J.D.
1978, University of Michigan. - Ed.
1. See, e.g., JERRY L. MAsHAw, GREED, CHAos, AND GOVERNANCE: UsING PUBLIC
CHOICE TO IMPROVE PUBLIC LAW (1997); DANIEL A. FARBER & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, LAW
AND PuBLIC CHOICE: A CRITICAL lNrnoDUCTION (1991).
2. Maxwell Stearns is an Associate Professor at the George Mason University School of
Law.
3. A briefer treatment of public choice, suitable for use as a supplement but not for a
complete course, is DAVID W. BARNES & LYNN A. STOUT, THE ECONOMICS OF CONSTITU
TIONAL LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE (1992). Besides its brevity, this work differs from the
Stearns book in that it takes the form of a traditional casebook, with its discussion of public
choice mostly added in the form of textual notes.
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portunity to examine Stearns's organization and choice of readings.
For others, it provides a primer on the topic. Building on Stearns's
materials in Part II, we offer some thoughts about how public
choice can best inform legal scholarship. A similar debate about
the utility of public choice has been raging in political science,4 and
we believe that this debate has generated some useful insights
about the possible contributions of public choice to understanding
legal issues. Indeed, some of the leading public choice scholars in
political science have now revamped their claims for the theory as a
result of this debate.5 Legal academics such as Stearns have not yet
had time to absorb these developments and thus may be asking
more from public choice theory than its best practitioners believe it
can realistically offer. Fmally, in Part III, we consider how public
choice can contribute to the education of law students. One of the
questions raised in Levmore's Foreword is the extent to which pub
lic choice should be integrated into existing courses, as opposed to
receiving a separate place in the curriculum (pp. xiv-xv). Our own
view, unlike Levmore's, is that public choice is likely to be most
useful when integrated into existing courses, but that materials like
Stearns's can serve a beneficial function for more advanced
students.
I.

PUBLIC CHOICE AND PUBLIC LAW: A GUIDED TOUR

Instead of using a casebook format, Public Choice and Public
offers a series of lengthy excerpts from scholarly articles, al
most all from law reviews, followed by extensive notes and explana
tory text by the author. Unlike the snippets of articles that most
law-school casebooks offer, the substantial portions of original
works provided by Stearns give authors a fair chance to elaborate
their views in their own words. Stearns's notes explore the readings
in detail, with citations to a broad segment of the scholarly litera
ture.6 By following Stearns through his tour of public choice, we
can get a good sense of the current state of legal scholarship in the
field.

Law

4. See THE RATIONAL CHOICE CONTROVERSY: ECONOMIC MODELS OF PoLmcs RECON·
SIDERED ( Jeffrey Friedman ed., 1996) [hereinafter THE RATIONAL CHOICE CONTROVERSY];
DONALD P. GREEN & IAN SHAPIRO, PATHOLOGIES OF RATIONAL CHOICE THEORY: A Cm.
TIQUE OF APPLICATIONS IN PoLmCAL SCIENCE (1994). "Rational choice" is a somewhat
more comprehensive term that includes both public choice and game theory.
5. See text accompanying notes 55·67 infra.
6. Not the least of the book's virtues is the 25·page bibliography, which should be invalu·
able to students and scholars who want to explore the literature more deeply. Pp. 977·1002.
The bibliography cites approximately 600 works, though some concern jurisprudence or con·
stitutional theory rather than public choice. Another very useful source for legal scholars is
PERSPECTIVES ON PUBLIC CHOICE: A HANDBOOK (Dennis c. Mueller ed., 1997) [hereinafter
PERSPECTIVES ON PuBLIC CHOICE).
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The book is divided into three segments: Chapter One in
troduces the use of rational choice models of political institutions;
Chapter Two covers social choice theory deriving from Arrow's
Theorem; and Chapter Three surveys selected applications to public
law. We follow that organization in this section.
A.

Rational Choice Models .

As Stearns points out in his Preface, public choice is not a mon
olithic field (pp. xvii-xviii) . It derives from three different academic
movements, each with a separate home base: the Chicago School,
which emphasized the tendency for the regulatory process to be co
opted by special interests; the Rochester school, which stressed "the
arbitrariness and unpredictability of governmental outcomes, at
least if the preferences of the legislators or their constituents are
employed as a baseline"; and the Virginia School, which studied
how constitutional frameworks could shape the future development
of public policy (pp. xviii-xix). Further, some public choice models
are based on standard microeconomics, while others are based on
game theory or on the work of Kenneth Arrow and his followers
(pp. xix-xx). Not surprisingly given the field's complex origins,
even its name is unsettled: public choice, social choice, rational
choice, and positive political theory have each been favored at one
time or another by various authors.7
What holds this diverse movement together is a common meth
odology based on the concept of rational decisionmaking: simply
put, political actors, like economic ones, make rational decisions
designed to maximize the achievement of their preferences. This
maximization assumption makes it possible to use mathematical
techniques of various kinds, many of them borrowed from econom
ics, to model political behavior. Less formally, it allows the applica
tion of economic insights to political behavior. These economic
insights can result in powerful conclusions about the political
system.
One such economic insight concerns the possibility of free rid
ing. A rational person would avoid investing in the production of a
benefit if virtually the same benefit could be enjoyed without the
investment. This simple point has manifold implications in eco
nomics, ranging from the instability of cartels - because individual
members of the cartel have an incentive to cheat - to the inade
quate market supply for public goods such as clean air - because
individuals prefer to enjoy the clean air without having to pay for
the pollution control equipment. It also has a powerful analogy in
7. Cf. Daniel Farber & Philip Frickey, Foreword: Positive Political Theory in the Nineties,
80 GEo. LJ. 457, 458-60 (199 2). Often, an author using a particular term would attribute
slightly different connotations to the other terms on the list.

1718

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 96:1715

politics, first pointed out by Mancur Olson.8 A legislative enact
ment may benefit everyone in a group, perhaps everyone in the
country, but each can enjoy a statute's benefits without having con
tributed to the lobbying effort. Hence, there is a temptation to free
ride and let other people pay the price to pass the new legislation.
As it turns out, the free-riding problem is inversely related to the
size of the group - for example, when the issue is air pollution, it is
much easier to mobilize a handful of car companies than the urban
population. (Group size is crucial for two reasons: (1) given the
same total benefit to the group, size is inversely related to the mag
nitude of any individual's stake; and (2) size increases transaction
costs.) The result is a skew in politics giving greater influence to
special interests - relatively concentrated groups with high individ
ual stakes - than to the diffuse interests of taxpayers, consumers,
and citizens generally. Given two groups with roughly equal but
opposing interests, the smaller group has an innate advantage.
The key to this argument is that political actors behave ration
ally in the sense that they maximize their expected personal wel
fare, taking into account both the costs and benefits of political
activities. Clearly, there are possible alternatives to this view: peo
ple may attempt to optimize outcomes but suffer from systematic
cognitive defects; their conflicting, incoherent, or unstable goals
may make optimizing impossible; strong emotional currents may
render them incapable of thinking rationally about consequences;
or they may behave rationally in some noninstrumentalist sense for example, by following a Kantian ethical edict. Notwithstanding
these potential alternatives, public choice theory rests on the prem
ise that instrumental rationality is an effective basis for predicting
political behavior, if not an entirely realistic psychological model.
Given its centrality to public choice, the rationality assumption
clearly warrants careful examination, and Stearns begins Chapter
One with a group of articles debating its validity. At one extreme,
Judge Abner Mikva rejects the premise of self-interested welfare
maximization in politics, remarking that even in the notoriously ve
nal Illinois legislature he had found examples of public-regarding
conduct.9 At the other extreme, Michael DeBow and Dwight Lee
provide a thoughtful defense of the assumption that "people will
allocate their limited means . . . to maximize their personal satisfac
tion. "10 In the middle, the book includes excerpts from our own
8. P. 16 (discussing MANcuR OLSON, THE LoGic OF COLLECTIVE ACTioN: Punuc
GOODS AND THE THEORY OF GROUPS (1965) ).
9. See p. 38 (excerpting Abner Mikva, Symposium on the Theory ofPublic Choice: Fore·
word, 14 VA. L. REv. 167 (1988 ) ).
10. P. 45 (excerpting Michael E. DeBow & Dwight R. Lee, The Jurisprudence of Public
Choice: A Response to Farber and Frickey, 66 TEXAS L. REv. 993 (1988 ) ).
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work, arguing that both ideology and self-interest play a role in the
political system.11
Voting provides one of the greatest challenges to the rationality
assumption. It is not clear that voting can be usefully explained as
an effort to maximize the achievement of some goal. Recall that
the temptation to free ride increases with the size of the group, and
here the group consists of the entire electorate. An individual vote
has almost no chance of influencing a national election. Indeed, it
would hardly be worth the trouble of standing in a voting line on
the minuscule chance of casting the single decisive vote in a Presi
dential election! Of course, it is possible that people simply like to
vote, that voting is a form of personal consumption, with pulling the
lever in the voting booth playing much the same role as jiggling the
joystick in a vid�o game. But this explanation seems distinctly un
helpful: it does little more than pronounce that people vote be
cause it is something they want to do.
Steams discusses several possible methods of saving the "con
sumption" explanation from tautology. One possibility is that peo
ple vote on the gamble that other people will choose to stay home,
thereby increasing the likelihood that they" will cast the decisive
vote. On the other hand, individuals may vote as a signal to others
that there is no point in playing this cat-and-mouse game, thus en
couraging people with contrary political views to stay home. Or,
perhaps people pursue extremely risk-averse strategies or are mis
led into thinking that their votes count (pp. 67-69). In any event,
Steams himself questions whether the "voting paradox" is really
important:

We might all agree that from the perspective of instrumental rational
ity, voting lies at the outer edge of human conduct. But so what?
Whatever the reasons for popular voting, the fact is that many people
vote. .More importantly, most activities in which people engage, in
cluding those that are the subject of public choice, can be explained
with models that are premised upon more intuitive understandings and manifestations - of rationality. [p. 69]

In particular, Steams argues, even if we cannot model voters, we
can model the behavior of elected officials on the assumption that
their sole goal is reelection. His rationale is that politicians who fail
to follow the model "quickly move off the radar of political ana
lysts, and of public choice scholars, if their principles prevent an
electoral victory'" (pp. 71-72). Hence, ."[i]f those candidates who
are elected behave as if they are primarily motivated by the desire
to be re-elected (regardless of their actual and initial motivations),
11. Pp. 5-35 (excerpting Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey, The Jurisprudence of Pub
lic Choice, 65 TEXAS L. REv. 873 {1987 ) ); pp. 58-6 2 (excerpting Daniel A. Farber & Philip P.
Frickey, Integrating Public Choice and Public Law: A Reply to DeBow and Lee, 66 TEXAS L.
REv. 1013 (1988 ) ).
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public choice modeling built upon the electoral goal postulate is
likely to remain robust." 12
The voter's paradox is not necessarily a fatal flaw in public
choice theory, but as we see in Part III of this review, it has received
considerable attention from political scientists, and for good reason.
Voter behavior is only a subset of public political conduct, which
includes making campaign contributions, joining interest groups,
and monitoring political affairs. If we cannot predict voting, it is
not clear that we can expect to do much .better in predicting these
other forms of behavior, and thus we leave many of the inputs into
the political process as unexplained "black boxes." Moreover, if we
cannot explain why people vote at all, we have no reason to think
we can account for how they vote. At best, we are left with a par':"
tial explanation of the overall political process. Furthermore, we
may not be able to rely entirely on natural selection among politi
cians to ensure that only the most reelection-oriented survive. De
pending on people's motivations for entering politics, at any given
time the political process might contain a large number of short
term players who nevertheless hold considerable political power.13
More fundamentally, if we have no workable model of political in
puts, the assumption that politicians try to maximize their chances
of reelection has limited predictive value.
As Stearns observes at the end of his discussion of the voting
paradox, the, voting-paradox debate raises a more general issue
about empirical validation: "[I]t may well be harder than it first
appears to test public choice modeling empirically" (p. 72). If the
assumptions of public choice theory are not completely realistic,
and if it does not generate testable empirical predictions, just what
claim does it have to validity? This partial disconnect between
modeling and empirical data raises important methodological is
sues, to which we will return in Part II. In any event, whether this
disconnect is a serious flaw depends in large part on what we expect
public choice theory to accomplish.
For the moment, however, we can put aside the voter's paradox
and indulge the assumption that politicians, at least, are instrumen
tally rational. Let us also put aside the question of empirical valida
tion and simply ask whether public choice theory has anything
1 2. P. 7 2. On the same theory, presumably, one might counsel hospital administrators to
act on the assumption that all patients are long-term residents of the hospital, because short
timers will "quickly move off the radar."
13. Indeed, the current move toward term limits markedly increases the likelihood of this
outcome. See Elizabeth Garrett, Term Limitations and the Myth of the Citizen-Legislator, 81
CORNELL L. REv. 6 23, 647-48 (1996 ). One can even imagine a process of reverse selection, in
which voters favor politicians whose past records suggest that they are willing to take princi
pled but seemingly inexpedient stands, so that politicians might take risky, unpopular stands,
gambling on achieving a higher office but increasing the risk of losing their current positions.
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interesting to say about issues of public law. The book's next batch
of material will reassure the student who has such concerns.
Stearns closes the first chapter with three case studies that help il
lustrate the theory's utility: the line-item veto, the nondelegation
doctrine, and the scope of judicial review. The discussion of the
line-item veto is illustrative and confirms that public choice can pro
vide intriguing insights.
Glen Robinson's article about the line-item veto14 makes an ef
fective analogy to economic bargaining models. Robinson points
out that the President and Congress are in a position of bilateral
monopoly. The President cannot obtain legislation without Con
gress, but given the difficulty of overriding vetoes, as a practical
matter Congress needs the President's consent to obtain what it
wants (p. 103). As Robinson observes, economists have studied bi
lateral monopolies extensively, but their predictions are cloudy (p.
105). After considering some of the strategic possibilities open to
both players, Robinson argues that "the effects of an item veto au
thority are more complex than they have been made out to be" (p.
107). He concludes that "[t]he complexities confound any simple
predictions about effects; probably the most reliable prediction
would be that the item veto would be only marginally useful in cur
tailing private goods legislation" (p. 107).
The other excerpt about the line-item veto, written by Stearns
himself,15 takes the strategic analysis a step further. Robinson's
model implicitly assumes that only a single piece of public-interest
legislation is on the table at any given time. Legislators must either
attach their riders to this one bill or present them as separate enact
ments. But, as Stearns points out, multiple public-interest propos
als actually are pending simultaneously, so legislators have a choice
about which proposal to use as a vehicle (p. 97). By threatening to
use the line-item veto if legislators attach riders to anything but his
favored bill, the President can extract support for his bill as the
price of obtaining passage of the rider. The end result is the pas
sage of the same amount of special-interest legislation despite the
line-item veto, but the President has much greater leverage over
general legislation vis-a-vis Congress (p. 98). The strategic process
could be more complicated still: for example, if the President re
gards the riders as too costly, he might tend to favor bills that re
quire little leverage of this kind, leading him back in the direction
of the general legislation favored by Congress.
·

14. Pp. 101-09 (excerpting Glen 0. Robinson, Public Choice Speculations on the Item
Veto, 74 VA. L. REv. 403 (1988 ) ),
15. Pp. 77-100 (excerpting Maxwell L. Stearns, The Public Choice Case Against the Item
Veto, 49 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 385 (199 2 ) ).
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The reader may or inay not have confidence in the ability of
public choice theory to predict the effects of the line item veto. But
pl.J.blic choice does illuminate the complexity of predicting the ef
fects of even the simplest procedural or institutional changes.16 If
nothing else, public choice reveals the assumption that the line item
veto will reduce pork-baµ-el legislation as highly simplistic.
B.

Arrow's Theorem

Chapter 1\vo is devoted to . Arrow's Theorem and its possible
implications for political institutions. Some background on Arrow's
Theorem may be useful before turning to Stearns's treatment of the
subject. Arrow was interested in the measurement of social wel
fare. Essentially, he asked whether, given only individual rankings
of outcomes, it is possible to derive a ranking of those outcomes for
society as a whole. Arrow placed very modest restrictions on the
ranking technique. Beyond some technical requirements necessary
to set up the problem, he added only two requirements for a tech
nique to qualify as a · social welfare measure. First, the technique
had to be nondictatorial. ObVi.ously, it would be easy to construct a
ranking of societal preferences by simply picking a dictator and
adopting that person's ranking. Whatever one might think of this
as a form of government, it clearly does not qualify as a measure of
social welfare. Hence, Arrow required that no one person's prefer
ences be decisive. This minimal form of egalitarianism, however, is
not enough to connect the resulting social-preference ranking with
social welfare. To provide such a link, Arrow also requir�d that the
technique· satisfy the Pareto standard. That is, if at least one person
in society prefers outcome 1 over outcome 2, and no one else has
the opposite preference, then society as a whole prefers outcome 1.
Again, this is a very weak requirement - it says nothing about
what happens when 240 million people prefer outcome 1 and only
one person prefers outcome 2.
Arrow's specifications thus amount to the barest possible quali
fications for a social welfare function. Quite remarkably, however,
he proved that no method of combining individual preferences can
satisfy these two qualifications along with the technical require
ments.17 The technical requirements themselves are seemingly
modest. Arrow's technical requirements are as follows:
16. As actually implemented, the "line item veto" turns out to be anything but simple
(and in fact is far from being ,a true line item veto ). For a discussion of the complexities of
the current statutory scheme, see Elizabeth Garrett, Accountability and Restraint: The Fed
eral Budget Process and the Line Item Veto (applying public choice to project some possible
consequences ) (forthcoming ).
17. For a fuller discussion of Arrow's theorem, see DENNIS C. MUELLER, PUBLIC CHOICE
II 384-99 (1989).
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Minimum Rationality. If society prefers outcome A to outcome B,
and outcome B to outcome C, then society prefers A over C.
Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives. If C is not on the agenda,
whether A is preferred to B should not depend on ·how either one
compares with C. This is really a disguised guarantee that outcomes
are based solely on how alternatives are ranked, rather than on how
intensely they �re desired.
Universal Applicability. The method has to work - that is, produce a
definite outcome - for any possibl�. combination of preferences, not
just particular distributions of preferences aw�ng the group.

Arrow was also interested in voting, and his theorem has impor
tant implications regarding voting mechanisms. Voting, like social
welfare measurements, may be considered a way of determining the
"public interest," and at the very least, it ranks alternatives based
on how they fare in an election. The immediate consequence of
Arrow's Theorem is that voting mechanisms must fail at least one
of Arrow's criteria. In most voting situations,' the sticking point is
minimum rationality. It turns out that even in very simple situa
tions it is possible for the electorate to choose outcome A over out
come B, and outcome B over C
but for outcome C to beat
outcome A (p. xii) .
This cycling of outcomes raises some obvious questions about
democratic institutions. For example, is majority rule too capri
cious to deserve the central role it has sometimes played in political
theory? Putting aside this normative question, we also find puzzles
about the actual behavior of legislatures. Specifically, because leg
islatures rarely exhibit cycling, we may wonder how legislatures are
able to produce stable outcomes. This inq¢ry tends to lead toward
the sophisticated use of game theory.18
For political scientists, Arrow's Theorem is only the starting
point in an attempt to model legislatures; Presumably, well-tested
models of the legislattire would be useful in considering public law
issues, but Steams does not explore the efforts of political scientists
to provide such models. Indeed, at one point he goes so far as to
warn the reader to "[b]eware the 'sophisticated' model" (p. 718).
Rather than exploring these more sophisticated models by political
scientists, Steams excerpts two law review articles on social choice
models of legislative voting. The first, by Saul Levmore, explores
the question of why legislatures generally follow certain decision
making procedures, such as a sequence of motions and amend
ments.19 Levmore proposes that, where cycling does not exist,
legislative rules are designed to identify the "true" winner - called
-

·

•

18. For a survey of some later efforts, see FARBER & FRICKEY, supra note 1, at 47-51.
19. Pp. 258-94 (excerpting Saul Levmore, Parliamentary Law, Majority Decisionmaking,
and the Voting Paradox, 15 VA. L. REv. 971 (1989 ) ).
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the Condorcet winner for historical reasons. Other times, legisla
tive rules are designed largely to paper over the possibility of cy
cling. Specifically, Levmore suggests that legislative procedures
may have evolved through applying the following guidelines:
(1) employ the motion-and-amendment process when there are few
alternatives because it promises to find any Condorcet choice without
encouraging unavoidable dissatisfaction; (2) when there are numerous
alternatives likely to be proposed, facilitate a switch to succession vot
ing because a Condorcet winner is quite unlikely and the switch will
make it difficult for the chair to manipulate the order of recognition
to unfairly influence the outcome; and (3) when succession voting ex
poses unavoidable dissatisfaction, tinker with the order in which pro
posals are considered.20

Levmore concludes that he has "produced . . . a strong positive the
ory which explains a remarkable number of decisionmaking rules.
"Moreover," he adds, the theory is "accompanied by an evolution
ary theory, built around the idea of dissatisfied majority coalitions,
which explains how things came to be as they are" (p. 294).
Although intriguing, Levmore's speculations have the disadvan
tage of being unprovable, as we know nothing about the history of
core parliamentary rules (pp. 259-62). Although, as Levmore says,
"it is easy to imagine" (p. 270) that something like his evolutionary
mechanism operated, we really have no way of knowing, particu
larly since Levmore does not give much thought to alternative ex
planations. But more important, in terms of its usefulness for
teaching purposes, Levmore's hypothesis is disassociated from any
larger research agenda about legislative structure or procedure of
the kind developed by political scientists. In particular, most polit
ical scientists consider Condorcet winners quite rare; indeed, one
theorem shows under plausible assumptions that no Condorcet win
ner exists if the issue space is multidimensional.21 Nor is it easy to
see why the rules should be designed primarily to produce Condor
cet winners if one by chance exists, because almost any set of rules
will do so if legislators are sophisticated and vote strategically (p.
282 n.136).

20. P. 285. Succession voting, mentioned in guideline 2, is a fill-in-the-blank process in
which proposals are considered in a preset order - for example, dates from earlier to later.
Pp. 272-76. The Condorcet winner beats every other alternative in pair-wise voting. It is thus
the "top" choice.
21. This result is known as the chaos theorem, because it seems to imply that all outcomes
cycle, leaving the legislature with no stability. See PETER C. 0RDESHOOK, GAME THEORY
AND POLITICAL THEORY: AN INTRODUCTION 76-82 (1986). Much effort has been devoted to
explaining why this instability does not obtain in reality. See FARBER & FRICKEY, supra note
1, at 48-57; Peter Ordeshook, The Spatial Analysis of Elections and Committees: Four De
cades of Research, in PERSPECTIVES ON PUBLIC CHOICE, supra note 6, at 250-56.
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Building on Levmore's theory, Stearns moves on to an excerpt
from one of his own articles.22 Stearns undertakes to compare the
voting procedures used in legislatures and courts with respect to
Arrow's criteria, with the aim of clarifying the relative strengths
and weaknesses of these institutions (p. 305). The hypothesis is that
courts use different voting rules than legislatures because courts are
sacrificing different items out of Arrow's list of criteria.23 The legis
lature is designed
a la Levmore (p. 323) - to seek a Condorcet
winner when one exists, but legislatures give up on the decisiveness
criteria, which means that often the legislature will produce no ac
tion whatsoever. Steams asserts that because courts must always
decide cases (p. 329), they sacrifice the possibility of finding the
Condorcet winner (pp. 329-38). More generally, the Arrovian "re
quirement of rationality in Supreme Court decisionmaking is
subordinated to the requirement that the Court decide all cases
before it" (p. 348).
-

This theory may somewhat outstrip the evidence. The notion
that the mandate to decide every case can explain basic features of
the judicial system seems a bit like the tail wagging the dog. It has
the additional disadvantage that the tail is flawed, inasmuch as the
Supreme Court is not in fact subject to any formal requirement to
make an affirmative decision in every case.24 On the contrary, the
decision rule is the same as that of the legislature: the status quo in the form of the lower court judgment - stands unless a majority
of Justices votes to change the result; thus the occasional notation
of cases "affirmed by an equally divided Court." Alternatively,
when, for whatever reason, no majority exists to decide a case, it
can be reset for argument the following Term, in theory a process
that could continue indefinitely. (The Court also has the option of
remanding for consideration in light of a completely inscrutable
opinion, which has the same practical effect as making no decision
at all.) Of course, if the Court frequently failed to issue any deci
sion at all, it would be subject to grave criticism. But this is not
necessarily different from Congress, whose failure to pass an appro
priations bill can shut down the government and cause considerable
consternation. So, the distinction between courts and legislatures
regarding the decisiveness criteria is less stark than Stearns
suggests.
Our point is not that the Levmore and Steams arguments have
possible flaws, but rather that their speculations about institutional
22. Pp. 295-354 (excerpting Maxwell L. Stearns, The Misguided Renaissance of Social
Choice, 103 YALE LJ. 1219 (1994)).
23. See supra text accompanying notes 17-18.
24. Like Stearns, we are putting aside the cases where the Court simply fails to grant
certiorari. P. 329 n.156.
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processes, while intriguing, may be too idiosyncratic to introduce
students effectively to the subject. The book provides a somewhat
broader look, however, as it moves on to consider some institu
tional implications of public choice. Here, the selections include:
an effort by Levmore to explain bicameralism, also based on the
pivotal importance of Condorcet winners;25 a well-known essay by
political scientist Ken Shepsle describing "legislative intent as an
oxymoron" on the ground that Arrow's Theorem eliminates the
concept of a coherent set of legislative . preferences;26 and two pa
pers about the possibility of cycling in Supreme Court decisions
presenting multiple issues.27 These papers do provide students a
somewhat broader exposure to social choice theory.2s
C.

Applications to Law

The final section of the book, Chapter Three, considers applica
tions of public choice to a broad range of issues, ranging from the
doctrine of stare decisis to antidiscrimination law. Most of the se
lections cover one of three general areas: the functioning of the
judiciary, the concept of legislative intent, and constitutional issues.
The first two areas are not our focus in this review. Research on
the judiciary is somewhat peripheral to the main body of public
choice scholarship - though by no means unimportant - and . the
two of us have already written more than enough about the subject
of legislative intent, some of it reprinted in the book (pp. 641-70).
Consequently, we will concentrate here on the constitutional area,
which probably holds the greatest interest for most readers. Be
cause the book includes excerpts on such a broad range of constitu
tional topics, it would be difficult to provide a comprehensive yet
coherent description. Instead, we will focus on two areas of partic
ular interest relating to the structure of government: federalism
and term limits.
25. P. 386 (excerpting Saul Levmore, Bicamer�lism: When Are Two Decisions Better than
One?, 12 lNrL. REv. L. & EcoN. 145 (1992)).
26. Pp. 393-408 (excerpting Kenneth A. Shepsle, Congress is a "They, " Not an "It": Leg·
is/ative Intent as an Oxymoron, 12 INTI.. REv. L. & EcoN. 239 (1992)).
27. Pp. 418-64 (excerpting Frank H. Easterbrook, Ways of Criticizing the Court, 95 HARV.
L. REv. 802 (1982) and Lewis A. Kornhauser & Lawrence G. Sager, Unpacking the Court, 96
'
YALE LJ. 82 (1986)).
28. Although each of these papers is individually interesting, it would probably be more
useful to give students a coherent picture of the ciirrent state of thought among public choice
theorists about institutional structures and procedures, rather than a handful of papers deal
ing with isolated problems. The extensive attention given to the procedures used by courts,
here and elsewhere in the book (pp. 477-551, 724-876), is probably a tribute to the continued
fascination that we in the legal academy have with the judiciary, while the public choice
literature as a whole pays more attention to legislatures-and, secondarily, to popular
elections.
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The topic of federalism is represented by an article by Jon
Macey about federal deference to local regulators.29 For example,
Congress allows Delaware law to govern the internal affairs of most
major corporations (p. 878 n.11). Macey asks why federal legisla
tors would ever allow states to regulate, rather than exercising their
power to preempt. After all, preemption would allow federal legis
lators to capture all of the political gains to be obtained from legis
lating on a topic (p. 878). In short, it would appear, "deference to
state regulators simply allows local lawmakers to capture for them
selves the political support available for supplying regulation to
rent-seeking constituents" (p. 880). Macey's theory is that "Con
gress will delegate to local regulators only when the political sup
port it obtains from deferring to the states is greater than the
political support it obtains from regulating itself'' (p. 878). Like a
business franchiser, Congress sometimes finds it more profitable to
subcontract rather than vertically integrating and taking over the
field. Macey suggests that this will be true when: (1) a particular
state like Delaware "has developed a body of regulation that com
prises a valuable capital asset"; (2) the most politically appealing
alternative varies sharply on a geographic basis; or (3) "Congress
can avoid potentially damaging political opposition from special
interest groups by putting the responsibility for a particularly con
troversial issue on state and local governments" (p. 879). Under all
other circumstances, however, "obtaining a federal law will be the
strategy of choice for most interest groups seeking to obtain wealth
transfers" (p. 880). In particular, "interest groups will favor federal
law over state law because states face stiffer competition from one
another than the federal government faces from other sovereign na
tions" (p. 882).

In sum, Macey maintains:

From a public-choice perspective, the federalist system can only
be viewed as a mechanism that provides a complement rather than a
substitute for federal law as a mechanism by which interest groups
can exchange political support for wealth transfers. Deferring regula
tory matters to the state legislatures must take its place alongside the
other strategies by which federal politicians can offer wealth transfers
to interest groups in exchange for political support. [p. 894]
Or, as Stearns plits it, " [i]n Macey's analysis, federalism is not a
doctrine with independent political content, but is instead a handy
label politicians attach to outcomes that they have reached for quite
independent reasons" (p. 895).

29. Pp. 877-94 (excerpting Jonathan R. Macey, Federal Deference to Local Regulators and
the Economic Theory of Regulation: Toward a Public-Choice Explanation of Federalism, 16
VA. L. REv. 265 (1990)).
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Federalism is an increasingly important area, both in constitu
tional law30 and public choice scholarship,31 and Stearns is to be
commended for including it in his coverage. The Macey article,
however, gives only a partial view of this developing body of litera
ture. While Macey's Chicago School perspective gives little weight
to institutional factors, much current research is dedicated to ex
ploring the institutional supports for federalism, including the struc
ture of American political parties, competition between states to
offer the optimal package of regulations, taxes, and services, the
influence of state governments as federal lobbyists, and the role of
the judiciary as enforcers of the federalist bargain.32 Perhaps a
fuller coverage of these institutional issues will be warranted in
later editions.
Stearns does address one question of institutional design - the
issue of term limits. Will term limits affect the behavior of legisla
tors, and if so, will it make them more or less inclined to follow the
lead of special interests? Linda Cohen and Matt Spitzer address
this topic through game theory.33 Unlike many selections in the
book, their paper offers a classic example of public choice research;
although lacking in mathematics, it gives students the genuine feel
of typical work by public choice theorists. Cohen and Spitzer care
fully specify their models, explicitly discuss each significant assump
tion, and then trace the logical implications of each model.
Although they provide variants, there are essentially two basic
models.
The first model explores the tendency of politicians to favor
projects with short-term benefits over long-term projects with
greater public benefits (pp. 930-39). The key assumption, which
Cohen and Spitzer support with some empirical evidence, is that
politicians primarily seek reelection and that voters primarily assess
candidates based on a candidate's past performance rather than
predictions about the future. In other words, voters engage in ret
rospective voting. Given these assumptions, politicians devalue
long-term projects for two reasons. Most obviously, benefits that
accrue after the politician leaves office provide him with no payoff.
Less obviously, the payoff from winning any one election is partly
the chance to run as an incumbent in later elections. The value of
this payoff, of course, depends on the number of potential future
elections a politician has left to win at any given time. For example,
30. See, e.g., Printz v. United States, 117 S. Ct. 2365 (1997); United States v. Lopez, 514
U.S. 549 (1995).
31. See, e.g., Symposium, The Law and Economics of Federalism, 82 MINN. L. REv. 249
(1997).
32. These issues are discussed in the contributions to the Minnesota symposium, id.
33. Pp. 925-60 (excerpting Linda Cohen & Matthew Spitzer, Term Limits, 80 GEO. L.J.
1992)).
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a project whose benefit accrues in a politician's last term before
retiring provides no reelection payoff at all and is therefore politi
cally worthless to him. The upshot is that politicians discount fu
ture benefits too heavily. Cohen and Spitzer go on to show that
term limits accentuate this effect - more benefits take place after
the politician has left office or when there are relatively few future
elections left to be won (pp. 936-39).
The second Cohen and Spitzer model illustrates an important
game theory concept known as unraveling (pp. 937-38). In its
baldest form, the problem is this. Suppose a legislator can only
serve for three terms. After his second reelection, the legislator no
longer faces the possibility of losing an election and therefore has
no reason to care about the opinion of the electorate. Instead, she
will cater to special interests who can provide her with benefits af
ter she leaves office. The electorate will respond by refusing to re
elect her a second time. The politician thus knows that her first
reelection campaign will be her last, so her second term will be free
from any electoral discipline. The electorate will respond by refus
ing to reelect even once, so we are left with a one-term legislature,
during which every legislator is a lame duck who is free from any
responsibility to the electorate and devotes himself to serving special interests.
·

Of course, this model is greatly. oversimplified, and Cohen and
Spitzer relax their assumptions to consider more realistic scenarios.
Nevertheless, they find, the general conclusion remains intact:
"Other things being equal, term limits should induce legislators to
spend more time servicing special interests and personal interests
than they do at present" (p. 951).
Unlike some public choice scholars, Cohen and Spitzer are cau
tious in drawing normative conclusions. As they point out, they de:
fine a special interest as "any minority of the constituency that
would not be served in a world of fµll information" (p. 958). Thus,
serving a special interest could include both "taking money for ter
minating fraud investigation" and "standing up for what is 'right' "
(p. 958). Cohen and Spitzer predict "more looting and graft, mixed
with an increased nuniber of principled stands against the elector
ate" (p. 959). Their concerns under the first model are less ambigu
ous, because they feel strongly that legislators are already too
present-minded (p. 959).
The Cohen and Spitzer models are hardly bulletproof. Their as
sumptions have some empirical support but are subject to dispute.
Moreover, it is possible that term limits would change the rules of
the political game enough to undermine their assumptions even if
they are now valid - for example, voters might switch away from
the retrospective voting that Cohen and Spitzer's first model as-

1730

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 96:1715

sumes. Or, as Cohen and Spitzer admit, other structural changes
such as strengthening of legislative ethics rules might counter some
of their projections (pp. 944-45). As Stearns points out, responsive
ness to district electorates may also lend itself to pork barrel legisla
tion, which term limits might usefully diminish (pp. 963-64). But
despite these and other possible replies to their argument,34 the
Cohen and Spitzer paper is an excellent example of how public
choice theory can help us think through the complex consequences
of institutional changes.
II.

PUBLIC CHOICE IN LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP

Under any but the most formalist view of legal analysis, an im
proved understanding of how government works can aid public law
scholarship. The question is whether - and how - public choice
can contribute to that understanding. In addressing this question,
we begin by examining a recent heated controversy about the ex
planatory power of public choice among political scientists. Unlike
many such debates, this one generated as much light as heat. Based
on some of the insights generated by this debate, we then use some
recent important work by legal scholars to illustrate how, in our
opinion, public choice can best be integrated into legal scholarship.
A.

The "Pathologies" Debate and the Limits of Theory

The debate opened in 1994 with the publication of Donald
Green and Ian Shapiro's book, Pathologies of Rational Choice The
ory. 35 Setting out to examine the public choice literature on its own
terms, Green and Shapiro ask what that literature has revealed
about politics, and conclude "that exceedingly little has been
learned."36 Although admitting that intellectually elegant models
had been created, they find little in the way of empirical payoff: a
"large proportion of the theoretical conjectures of rational choice
theorists have not been tested empirically," and " [t]hose tests that
have been undertaken have either failed on their own terms or gar
nered theoretical support for propositions that, on reflection, can
only be characterized as banal."37 In short, they vigorously disagree
with Stearns's assessment that public choice offers "rich and falsifi
able theses about collective decisionmaking" (p. xxii).
34. For the contrary view about the desirability of term limits, see Einer Elhauge, Are
Term Limits Undemocratic?, 64 U. CHI. L. REv. 83 {1997). See also Garrett, supra note 13, at
639 (critiquing the Cohen and Spitzer model but concluding for other reasons that term limits
will not decrease the power of special interests).
35. GREEN & SHAPIRO, supra note 4.
36. Id. at x.
37. Id. at 6.
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In their survey of the empirical evidence, Green and Shapiro
cover a broad range of topics: the voter's paradox, prisoner's di
lemmas and free-riding, legislative behavior, and spatial theories of
electoral competition. They accuse public choice researchers of a
number of methodological pathologies, including (1) developing
models to fit the data, rather than testing models by making predic
tions, (2) failing to test competing explanations, (3) making vague
or ambiguous predictions that cannot readily be falsified, and (4)
mining the historical record for confirming data.38
Green and Shapiro's analysis of the voter's paradox is illustra
tive. As we saw in Part I, one possible explanation for voting is that
the act itself is gratifying - that is, has consumption value. Green
and Shapiro point out, however, that no one has offered indepen
dent evidence of this consumption value apart from voter turnout
itself - the fact to be explained. They also observe that it seems
peculiar that people do not obtain equal consumption value from
other actions such as jury service or writing letters to legislators.
An equally unproven explanation is that political leaders are aware
of who votes and offer selective incentives to individual voters. Or,
perhaps voters have inflated estimates of the likelihood of casting
the tie-breaking vote, though no evidence of such a cognitive error
. has been produced.39 More recent efforts to resolve the voter's par
adox involve game theory. In some game theory models, "voters
simultaneously decide whether to vote based on their strategic an
ticipation of others' actions [producing] an equilibrium result in
which many people tum[ ] out."40 The problem is that the results
depend entirely on the assumption that voters are perfectly in
formed about the voting costs of other citizens and about the exact
level of support of the candidates.41 Turnout disappears with more
realistic assumptions about voters. Nor are Green and Shapiro im
pressed by the argument that voting is a uniquely low-cost activity
that consequently offers an unusual chance to express ideological
preferences: "Can it be said of Latin America� elections, in which
voters spend hours in polling lines, sometimes amid threats of vio
lence, that turnout is a low-cost activity? What of the more than
100,000 African-Americans who persevered through the intimida
tion and poll taxes of the Jim Crow South and voted in the national
elections of the 1950s?"42 Finally, they consider the fall-back as
sumption that, while public choice cannot explain the existence of
high turnout, it can explain marginal variations in turnout relating
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.

See id. at 33-46.
See id. at 51-56.
Id. at 57.
See id. at 57-58.
Id. at 58-59.
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to the closeness of the election or the costs of voting - for exam
ple, bad weather. They find the theory's empirical predictions
about these marginal effects to be either banal or unconfirmed.43
In sum, Green and Shapiro conclude, "[r]eaders interested in
the determinants of voter turnout . . . will derive little insight from
the empirical work in the rational choice tradition."44 It is difficult,
they contend, to see how rational choice theory could be discon
firmed given the range of maneuvers open to account for the data,
including "post hoc insertion of idiosyncratic tastes, beliefs, and
probability assessments as explanatory devices."45 Nor do they find
the voter's paradox to be an isolated failure of public choice theory.
They find similar failings in the literature on the related problem of
free riding and collective action, a problem that is basic to the Chi
cago School's prediction of undue influence by concentrated special
interests.46
Given Stearns's stress on problems of cycling, it is also worth
considering Green and Shapiro's empirical evidence on the subject.
They begin by deconstructing purported historical examples of cy
cling offered by William Riker and others.47 Green and Shapiro
find little empirical evidence on the question of whether institu
tional arrangements affect instability,48 nor even testable predic
tions on this question.49 Perhaps most tellingly, they find that the
experimental evidence fails to confirm clearly a central prediction
of voting theory: that outcomes should be found in the "core"
when one exists.50 Moreover, seemingly extraneous factors, like
perceptions of fairness, differences in the gaming talents of the par
ticipants, and cognitive difficulties, seem to affect outcomes heav
ily.51 Indeed, the dispersion of outcomes seems to be only a little
larger in games without a core, where cycling should be rampant.52
None of these findings, of course, disprove Arrow's Theorem; by
definition, mathematical theorems cannot be falsified empirically.
What is unclear is whether Arrow's Theorem and its successors lead
to useful falsifiable predictions about how actual legislatures be
have under varying conditions.
43. See id. at 59-68.
44. Id. at 68.
45. Id. at 69.
46. See id. at 72-97.
47. See id. at 109-11.
48. See id. at 113.
49.
50.
51.
52.

See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.

at 117-19.
at 127-28.
at 129-31.
at 135.
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Green and Shapiro's conclusion, in a nutshell, is that public
choice has failed to produce usable empirical knowledge. They find
little payoff in terms of understanding actual political behavior.
They call upon public choice theorists "to get closer to the data so
as to theorize in empirically pertinent ways," and to open their eyes
to competing hypotheses about human behavior stemming from so
cial sciences other than economics.53
Although Stearns does not cite Pathologies of Rational Choice
leading researchers in the field have taken the book seri
ously. Public choice theorists were quick to respond to the accusa
tion that they had failed to live up to their own methodological
standards that required scientific theories to deduce falsifiable pre
dictions subject to rigorous statistical testing. Perhaps the most in
teresting feature of the responses is the extent to which leading
public choice scholars themselves rejected these "scientific" aspira
tions in favor of a more humanistic approach.54 Consider the views
of three leading public choice scholars: John Ferejohn, Morris
Fiorina, and Ken Shepsle.

Theory,

Ferejohn, in an essay coauthored with Debra Satz,55 argues that
Green and Shapiro's "conception of what constitutes a contribution
to knowledge is too narrow; it excludes much good social sci
ence."56 Specifically, the essay argues, social science theories serve
other important purposes besides producing valid empirical predic
tions. First, a good theory may make problematic previously unex
amined phenomena - like voter turnout - creating a new
research agenda. Second, a theory may unify apparently unrelated
phenomena or shed light on deep structural similarities that might
otherwise escape understanding.57 For example, pointing to studies
of the reelection motive of legislators, the essay applauds the re
search for demonstrating .the existence of an underlying causal
mechanism for seemingly unrelated phenomena: ''Even if none of
these studies had provided an improved statistical account of any
specific behavioral phenomenon, they would remain outstanding
additions to our understanding of congressional behavior and
organization. "58
Fiorina takes a similar position. He argues that the "notion of
empirical research that 'contributes to our understanding of poli53. See id. at 203.
54. For an overview, see Jeffrey Friedman, Introduction: Economic Approaches to Poli
tics, in THE RATIONAL CHOICE CoNrROVERSY, supra note 4, at 1-24.
55. John Ferejohn & Debra Satz, Unification, Universalism, and Rational Choice Theory,
in THE RATIONAL CHOICE CoNrROVERSY, supra note 4, at 71.
56. Id. at 72.
57. See id. at 72-76.
58. Id. at 76.
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tics' is far more general than the idea of testing a specific theoretical
proposition."59 For example, he says, "it boggles the mind that any
one would deny the empirical contributions that resulted from the
work of Mancur Olson."60 Olson's theory provided an explanation
of a familiar phenomenon - the unequal representation of differ
ent interest groups in the political process. In doing so, he sparked
a new research agenda about why people join groups, and he pro
vided the basis for imaginative accounts of larger-scale events like
the periodic surges in congressional power. Thus, Fiorina says, we
need a broader conception of what constitutes an empirical
contribution:

Every empirically based modification, generalization, or even re
jection of Olson is an empirical contribution stimulated by his work.
Every extension of his ideas to new areas is an empirical contribution.
Every incorporation of his ideas in larger explanatory accounts is an
empirical contribution. Even seeming counter-examples that lead
people to see matters in a new light are empirical contributions.61
Besides their overly demanding concept of empiricism, Fiorina
says, Green and Shapiro also overlook several important aspects of
public choice itself. First, public choice is a general perspective, not
a unified theory, so there is a large diversity of scholarship embody
ing many different models: "every manner of disagreement - the
oretical, substantive, methodological - can be found" in public
choice.62 Second, public choice is not intended as a monocausal ex
planation. Instead, it is offered with an implicit "all other things
being equal" clause. For example, Olson's work does not predict
the absence of collective organizations, but merely that, all things
being equal, larger, diffuse groups are more difficult to organize
than small concentrated ones.63 Finally, no public choice model is
intended as a comprehensive explanation of an institution. Instead,
each offers a partial view focusing on significant features of the in
stitution. As a result, "there will never be a single . . . model of a
real presidential campaign, of the U.S. Congress, or of the federal
regulatory process. What we are engaged in is the construction of
scores of models that focus on different aspects of political institu
tions and processes."64
Like Fiorina and Ferejohn, Shepsle faults Green and Shapiro for
having too narrow a view of public choice and too restricted a con
cept of valid research. Given the undeveloped nature of political
59. Morris P. Florina, Rational Choice, Empirical Contributions, and the Scientific Enterprise, in THE RATIONAL CHOICE CoNTROVERSY, supra note 4, at 90.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 91.
62. Id. at 87.
63. See id. at 88-89.
64. Id. at 89.
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science, he says, "a theory may remain a live prospect, even though
it is not a very good theory, because it trumps alternatives" which, he adds, should be a source of modesty for public choice
theorists.65 Moreover, one should be "charitable toward relatively
soft assessments" of theories given the great difficulty of rigorous
statistical testing.66 Finally, Shepsle says, Green and Shapiro under
estimate the extent to which public choice scholars hav� responded
constructively to criticism by incorporating cultural explanations
into their models and generalizing their models to include human
cognitive limitations.67
The upshot of these responses is a significant modesty about the
aspirations of public choice theory. A public choice model may
give us insights into commonalities between different phenomena; it
may suggest new avenues for empirical research; and it may provide
insights into how particular aspects of institutions function. Public
choice theory will not, however, give us a unified model of even a
single major political institution that accounts for all aspects of its
behavior, let alone a model ofthe political system as a whole. Nor
will public choice allow us to evade a realistic appreciation of the
complexities of human behavior, whether those complexities be
come complications of the model itself, as Shepsle suggests, or serve
instead as implicit, "all things being equal" conditions, as Fiorina
suggests. In short, we can hope for insights from public choice the
ory, but we are not going to get The Truth About Politics anytime
soon.
From the point of view of legal scholars, the ideal interdiscipli
nary theory would have several characteristics. It would be simple
- so that even law professors could use it. It would be unequivocal
in its predictions - so we could easily use the predictions to evalu
ate the consequences of legal rules. It would explain all or most
human behavior within some clearly specified field of activity - so
we would know when to apply it. Finally, it would produce verified
but counterintuitive predictions - so that it would reveal some
thing startling about legal rules. As is evident from the debate over
Green and Shapiro's book, public .choice is not this dream theory.
But that does not mean that it is useless from the point of view of
legal scholars. Instead, it means that we must be more realistic in
our expectations for interdisciplinary scholarship. As we will see,
despite its shortcomings, public choice has been used to good effect
to illuminate legal issues.
65. See Kenneth A. Shepsle, Statistical Political Philosophy and Positive Political Theory,
in THE RATIONAL CHOICE CoNTROVERSY, supra note 4, at 217.
66. See id. at 219.
67. See id.

at

220-21.
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Fruitful Encounters Between Law and Public Choice

Stearns lauds public choice for providing "a powerful set of ana
lytic tools with which to evaluate the most pressing problems that
face public policy makers, lawyers, bureaucrats, and judges" (p. xx
iii). In light of the Pathologies debate, however, the reader may
wonder whether public choice really does have anything useful to
contribute to public la,w. We believe the answer is yes. In this sub
section, we discuss three recent, and in our opinion, successful uses
of public choice insights in public law scholarship. Our purpose is
not merely to pass out plaudits, but to use these examples to ex
plore the conditions under which public choice is likely to prove
most useful in legal scholarship.
Our first example is Jerry Mashaw's recent work on pre
enforcement review of administrative regulations.68 In the past few
decades, rulemaking has played an increasingly central role in ad
ministrative regulation, and courts have responded by allowing im
mediate judicial review of regulations - without waiting for
application of the regulation to specific situations. Today, there is
considerable dissatisfaction about the "ossification" of the rulemak
ing process, a problem that may be partly due at least to overzeal
ous judicial review. As a result, agencies increasingly abandon
rulemaking for other - often less desirable - regulatory tech
niques. 69 Mashaw suggests that we might usefully restructure judi
cial review to decrease the incentive for private interests to exploit
judicial review as a form of obstruction.
Specifically, Mashaw argues that limiting pre-enforcement judi
cial review would dramatically improve the incentives of private
parties. To explore this possibility, he uses simple game theory
models, working through two pre-enforcement review games and
one who-will-sue game.70 These models demonstrate that a firm
will almost always bring pre-enforcement suit if there is no penalty
for noncompliance with the regulation during the litigation. If
there is a penalty for noncompliance, the game becomes more com
plicated, because it becomes likely that some firms will comply
rather than sue. This successful compliance may increase the likeli
hood that a court will uphold the regulation - and hence the likeli
hood of a penalty against noncompliers. Challenges to regulations
do not disappear, but the likelihood of challenges becomes sensitive
to parameters such as the probability of success.
At least in some settings, Mashaw suggests, shifting the timing
of review would have valuable consequences. It would push regu68. MAsHAw, supra note 1, at 158-80.
69. See id. at 158-66.
70. See id. at 167-74.
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lated parties toward devoting their energies to a good-faith effort to
comply rather than toward elaborating arguments about the impos
sibility of compliance. It would make judicial review more realistic,
because review could be based not only on the record before the
agency but on evidence about the real-world implementation of the
regulation. It would eliminate unnecessary judicial review where
compliance costs tum out to be lower than expected by industry.
But Mashaw does not offer pre-enforcement review as a panacea.
He concedes that pre-enforcement review may be suitable where
the need for legal certainty is especially high - for example, when
environmental regulations require complex interactions between
different levels of government.71
·

Our purpose here is not to endorse Mashaw's proposal,72 but
rather to highlight his fruitful use of game theory. The decision of
one firm to sue depends on the strategic decisions of other firms,
and game theory is designed to clarify just such complex interac
tions. But Mashaw wisely does not place sole reliance on his mod
els. Instead he draws on his own learning as an expert on
administrative law to assess the significance of the conclusions.
Thus, he melds his legal expertise with public choice techniques.
Our second example also deals with interactions between courts
and agencies. In a substantial body of work culminating in a recent
book,73 Bill Eskridge argues that statutory interpretation by courts
inevitably involves value judgments that evolve_ over time. For this
reason, he conceptualizes courts as participants in a dynamic inter
action with agencies and Congress, rather than being aloof from the
rest of the governance system. Eskridge makes apt use of public
choice models to assess the way in which the Chevron doctrine74
affects interactions between the branches of government. He mod
els statutory interpretation as a sequential game involving median
legislators in both houses, the President, agencies, and the courts.
His analysis suggests two conclusions. One conclusion is rather ba
nal: the Chevron doctrine increases presidential power to shift pol
icy over time (pp. 190-93). The other conclusion, however, is more
intriguing. The models suggest that ·"even if judicial preferences
about statutory policy were completely unrelated to legislative pref-

71. See id. at 174-80.
72. For criticisms, see Mark Seidenfeld, Playing Games with the Timing of Judicial Re
view: An Evaluation of Proposals to Restrict Pre-Enforcement Review of Agency Rules, 58
Omo ST. L.J. 85 {1997); Jim Rossi, Public Choice Theory and the Fragmented Web of the
Contemporary Administrative State, 96 MICH. L. REv. 1746 {1998) (reviewing MAsHAw, supra
note 1).
73. WILLIAM N. EsKRIDGE, JR., DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION {1994).
74. The Chevron doctrine, named after Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources De
fense Council, 467 U.S. 837 {1984), requires courts to defer to reasonable agency interpreta
tions of statutes. See EsKRIDGE, supra note 73, at 161-64.

1738

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 96:1715

erences
aggressive judicial review would not necessarily be
countermajoritarian because it would create a new default position
relatively less influenced by presidential preferences. "75 It is this
capacity to produce novel insights that make public choice a poten
tially useful tool.
Our final example is drawn from the work of an economist,
rather than a law professor. Interestingly enough, it is less oriented
toward formal modeling and more toward empirical evidence than
the last two examples. William Fischel provides an in-depth analy
sis of takings law in his recent book, Regulatory Takings.76 One of
his intriguing suggestions is that the application of takings law
should be more stringent for local governments than for higher
levels of government. His argument, which he only sketches, rests
on the propensity of local governments to break their commit
ments, because the long-term effects of such betrayals will fall upon
future residents of the community, who often come from elsewhere,
rather than the community's current residents and their descen
dants.77 Competition between localities for residents and busi
nesses mitigates this effect, but the restraining effect of competition
fails to operate in some settings, particularly those involving the
regulation of immobile capital. In contrast, higher levels of govern
ment are more inclusive and less able to externalize costs on outsid
ers. Although Fischel's argument is rooted in public choice theory,
what makes it plausible is the body of empirical evidence, ranging
from the anecdotal to the econometric, that Fischel presents about
the tendency of local government to impose costs on outside own
ers of fixed assets.1s
We consider each of these examples to be a successful use of
public choice theory in legal scholarship. Though one may well
quarrel with each author's ultimate conclusions, each effectively
uses public choice to expose a previously neglected dimension of a
legal issue, whether it be the effect of timing rules on litigation
against agencies, the relationship between judicial review and sub
sequent legislative action, or the relevance of a jurisdiction's size to
the propensity toward overregulation of land use. By highlighting
some neglected structural aspect of a situation, each author pro75. EsKRIDGE, supra note 73, at 167. By countermajoritarian, Eskridge means that the
outcome is farther away from the ideal points of the legislature, which means that the out
come would be less likely to receive the sanction of the Article I lawmaking process.
76. WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, REGULATORY TAKINGS: LAW, ECONOMICS, AND PoLmcs
{1995).
77. See id. at 131-35.
78. See id. at 289-324. One particularly striking example involves studies of rent control
regulations for mobile homes in some California co=unities that prevent owners of mobile
home parks from utilizing any "exit" options while leaving them at the prey of localities with
high concentrations of tenants. Id. at 309-24.
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vides a basis for an innovative modification of existing legal rules.
Each author also shows a sensitivity to cross-cutting normative is
sues - for example, the tension between our commitment to the
democratic process and our desire to block special-interest legisla
tion. None of the authors attempt to give the public choice findings
more weight than they can reasonably carry.

Notably, we think, each work is by an author with a deep, long
standing immersion in both the field of law and the relevant public
choice literature, not someone who has merely read a few Supreme
Court cases and knows the term "rent-seeking." At least in the
right hands, then, the tools of public choice theory can make a gen
uine contribution to public law scholarship.

These uses of public choice may be less ambitious than the
fondest hopes of some of its early advocates in legal scholarship.
But these applications of public choice are consistent with the more
modest aspirations expressed in responses to Green and Shapiro.
As we saw, Ferejohn, Fiorina, and Shepsle praised public choice
more for its ability to offer illuminating explanations of particular
phenomena than as a source of certainty about governmental func
tioning, while admitting that - at least as yet - its predictive pow
ers are limited. The legal scholarship discussed in this subsection
harmonizes with the views expressed by Peter Ordeshook, another
prominent public choice scholar, in the Pathologies debate:
Thus, rather than approach the construction ,and assessment of
models as though we were scientists discovering basic laws of the uni
verse, we should try to solve specific problems in specific contexts
with an understanding that different models may be best suited for
different situations. Every bridge is a special problem in engineering.
We also need to appreciate that certain aspects of reality cannot yet
be subjected to abstract theoretical analysis, or even to fully coherent
empirical analysis. Crude rules of thumb, intuition based on experi
ence, simple insight, and "mindless statistical analysis" will be an es
sential part of our enterprise.79

We leave it to political scientists to decide whether Ordeshook's
advice is suitable for their discipline, but we have little doubt that
his views about the uses of public choice are entirely on target with
respect to legal scholars.

III:

PUBLIC CHOICE IN THE CLASSROOM

One implication of our discussion is that public choice has influ
enced legal scholarship in some important ways and, if applied with
appropriate modesty, may have even more significant influence in
the future. As in at least the early days of law and economics, how-

79. Peter Ordeshook, Engineering or Science: What is the Study of Politics?, in THE RA
TIONAL CHOICE CoNTROVERSY, supra note 4, at 187.
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ever, it is much more daunting to analyze how public choice can be
domesticated for the law school classroom. It may be a hit in the
glitzy Broadway of the faculty lounge, but how will it play in the
Peoria heartland of the classroom?
Few law professors have developed sophistication with public
choice. Those who have may find Steams's book an excellent vehi
cle for teaching a seminar or course devoted to the subject.
Levmore, for example, reports that he used portions of the book in
manuscript form and found much student enthusiasm for the mater
ials (p. xiii) . Even sophisticates, however, may face some structural
difficulties. Unlike Richard Posner's Economic Analysis of Law80
and, to a lesser extent, Mitchell Polinsky's An Introduction to Law
and Economics, 81 Steams's book is constituted largely of lengthy
excerpts of law review articles, with numerous questions and com
ments interspersed. Both the Posner and Polinsky books are in
monograph form, eschewing reprinting the work of others. Accord
ingly, as the products of one mind and organizational structure,
they provide a more integrated and overarching look at their sub
ject. In our experience pondering the presentation of law-and
materials to students, books of the Posner-Polinsky format tend to
lend themselves more easily to classroom use. We have not taught
out of Stearns's book, however, and in any event have no desire to
belabor this matter of pedagogical taste.
We doubt that we have much useful pedagogical advice to offer
to sophisticates who have dedicated at least some of their scholarly
agenda to the relationship of public law and public choice. Obvi
ously, these professors are well equipped to take on Stearns's book
as teachers and follow Levmore's advice that public law and public
choice should be offered as a methodological course, much like law
and economics, feminist legal theory, and so on (pp. xiv-xv). Will
such methodological courses supplant traditional substantive
courses? For the moment, we doubt that a revolution in the law
school curriculum along these lines is about to happen. Frankly, we
also doubt that, as yet, many law professors have come to share
Levmore's judgment that "[t]he most exciting intellectual develop
ment in law schools in the last decade is surely the arrival and
growth of public choice theory" (p. xi).
The much more daunting question is what the professor who
finds public choice analysis helpful in analyzing public law should
do in the classroom, if she is unable or unwilling to offer a course or
seminar dedicated solely to the relationship of public law and public
choice. The obvious alternative to the focused, methodological ap
proach is what Levmore himself calls the "trans-substantive" ap80.
81.

RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (4th ed. 1992).
A. MITCHELL POLINSKY, AN !Nrn.ODUCTION TO LAW AND ECONOMICS (2d ed.
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proach, in which an area of law is enriched by interdisciplinary
analysis (p. xv). Our preference for this undertaking is exemplified
by the two casebooks we have edited, which both attempt to weave
public choice analysis into various topics of public law that are at
the core of the fields the books cover.82 But even in situations in
which a teacher of public law is using a casebook that provides no
linkage to public choice, she has a rich array of articles - many of
them excerpted by Stearns - from which to pick and choose illus
trations in which public choice provides useful analysis.83
For example, when one of us taught a basic course in statutory
a few years ago, using a casebook that did not mention
public choice analysis, he found it helpful to illuminate the Supreme
Court's shifting approaches to the interpretation of these statutes
through public choice analysis. That was not a difficult task: Bill
Eskridge had published an article that provided a roadmap for ana
lyzing these jurisprudential meanderings through straightforward,
easily understood public choice analysis - the sort of thing that
lends itself to intuitive diagrams on the blackboard.84 The teacher
never assigned the article to the students, but instead did a bit of
the rabbit-out-of-the-hat act the first time the topic seemed logi
cally to present itself in class. The students were fascinated by it
and themselves returned to that analysis at later points, often with
out the need for any suggestive questions from the podium. This
approach worked well because the insights were intuitive, required
no sophisticated mathematics or modeling, and were of general in
terest to students because they provided a sharper window on basic
lawyerly questions, such as the extent to which the Supreme Court
has demonstrated the apparent capacity to engage in strategic statu
tory interpretation and the factors that would seemingly influence
the exercise of strategic discretion.

civil rights

Similarly, in teaching environmental law, one of us has found it
useful to introduce the Chicago School model of interest group in
fluence. Environmental law seemingly serves the diffuse social in
terest in environmental quality at the expense of concentrated
industry interests. It thus presents something of a puzzle for the
Chicago School. Bringing in the Chicago School model serves two
purposes. First, it invites students to consider the ways in which
82. See DANIEL A. FARBER ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAw: THEMES FOR THE CONSTITU
TION'S THIRD CENTURY (2d ed. 1998); WILLIAM N. EsKRIDGE, JR. & PmLIP P. FruCKEY,
CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION: STATUI'ES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY
(2d ed. 1995). We organized and presented the materials in a way that, we hope, allows the
professor who does not desire to present public choice analysis simply to skip over it.
83. Ironically, the success of Steams's book in the economic marketplace is endangered
by this "free riding," in which his book serves as a sort of teacher's manual for those teaching
public law.
84. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Reneging on History? Playing the Court/Congress/Presi
dent Civil Rights Game, 79 CAL. L. .REv. 613 (1991).
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special interests may have succeeded in reshaping environmental
legislation to serve better their own interests.85 Second, it raises the
question of how our society has managed to overcome the transac
tion costs and free-rider barriers to environmental legislation. Part
of the answer may be the role played by environmental groups in
the process of creating and implementing environmental law.86 An
appreciation of the role of these groups can improve students' un
derstanding of the dynamics of environmental law.
Our guess is that this episodic approach is the most frequent
scenario by which public choice is making its way into the class
room. To be sure, it is a somewhat intellectually impoverished
pedagogy when compared to a class dedicated to public choice. But
if done carefully, it broadens the intellectual content of the law
school classroom in a way that demonstrates to students a meaning
ful linkage between the practice of law and interdisciplinary in
sights. Unfortunately, the messages law students receive about law
and- analysis are often not the ones professors are attempting to
send. A class dedicated to law-and- analysis threatens to suggest to
law students that the professor is grudgingly employed in a profes
sional school while attempting to replicate graduate-school curricu
lar offerings that have no obvious utility to the practicing bar.
Much the same problem arises from poorly integrated law-and- in
sertions into traditional courses: the message is something like, "we
will now spend ten minutes on something intellectually interesting,
unlike our basic casebook material, and unlike what lawyers really
do for a living."
The trans-substantive approach provides a number of ways to
combat this problem. For example, one of us introduces many of
the topics in the Legislation course through the use of a case study
of the adoption of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,87 followed by an
examination of United Steelworkers v. Weber, 88 a well-known case
addressing whether Title VII of the Act forbids voluntary affirma
tive action in private employment.89 One lesson extracted from
Weber is that there are at least three potential perspect.ives to give
meaning to a statute - the textual perspective, focusing on statu
tory language; the institutional perspective, focusing on the legisla
ture in general and the legislative history of the statute in particular;
and the contextual perspective, focusing on the factual and legal
85. The classic discussion of this phenomenon is BRUCE A. ACKERMAN & WILLIAM T.

HAssLER, CLEAN CoAiiDIRTY AIR (1981).

86. For further exploration of these issues, see Daniel A. Farber, Politics and Procedure
in Environmental Law, 8 J.L. EcoN. & 0RG. 59, 59-61, 65-72 (1992).
87. Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241.
88. 443 U.S. 193 (1979).
89. See EsKRIDGE & FruCKBY, supra note 82, at 1-34, 71-87.

May 1998]

Public Choice

1743

situation in which the parties find themselves years after the statute
was drafted and enacted. The instructor then has the class examine
materials presenting three models ·of the legislative process - one
focusing on problems of rational choice, such as Arrow problems;
another examining interest group formation and activity, including
free-rider problems; and a third assessing the deliberative capacities
of the legislative process.90 The first two models seemingly under
cut the attractiveness of focusing on the institutional perspective in
interpreting statutes� · The legislature ends up looking like an insti
tution capable of reaching majoritarian decisions that are arbitrary
for Arrovian reasons and lack any coherent underlying purpose. To
the extent that any organizing intent lies behind a statute, more
over, the interest group transactional model posits that it merely
reflects a systematic skewing .of political power in favor of small,
well-organized interests. The third - deliberative - model is
more normatively attractive, but strikes many students as descrip
tively implausible.
This conversation is designed to debunk the institutional per
spective on giving meaning to statutes. At that point, the instructor
then briefly has the class debunk the other two perspectives as well.
Students are usually able to bring something from their undergrad
uate liberal-arts education of assistance here. For example, the no
tion of plain textual meaning is subject to a variety of objections,
such as deconstruction theory, the theory that textual autonomy
cannot be divorced from authorial intent, and the notion that tex
tual meaning requires an understanding of the interpretive commu
nity engaged in assessing it. Similarly, the notion that judges can
achieve pragmatic contextual outcomes is challenged · by studies
measuring the impact of judicial decisions and by basic law-and
economics analysis of the inefficiency of some areas of the law.
One major goal of the exercise is to demonstrate that learning from
allied fields is, indeed, relevant to the practice of law, when legal
practice is understood as induding an important component of for
mulating arguments in an ongoing dialogue within a professional
community where interpretive theory remains essentially contested.
·

In a Legislation course that focused not only on statutory inter
pretation but on structural issues such as term limits and on process
issues such as campaign finance reforms, an even stronger case can
be made for introducing public choice theory at the beginning of
the course. Once the theory has been explored in some depth, the
teacher can return to the public choice models throughout the
course when confronting, for example, regulation of lobbying,
single-subject rules, the appropriations process, and so on. Simi
larly, a constituti9nal law course that focused on the structural is90. See id. at 44-61.
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sues of federalism and separation of powers might benefit from the
conceptual framework provided by public choice theory.
There are surely a variety of ways in which teaching materials
. might attempt to overcome the difficulties of presenting law-and
materials so that students appreciate their relevance. Stearns has
made a noble effort to overcome these difficulties. His book fo
cuses on a number of topics of obvious significance even to lawyers
who narrowly conceive their professional purview - the legislative
veto, the nondelegation doctrine, statutory interpretation, stare de
cisis, constitutional structure, and so on. Furthermore, his ques
tions often attempt to push students toward the integration of
insights gleaned from public choice into legal doctrine. Only time
will tell whether his methodological structure, or our trans
substantive and sometimes episodic preferences, will prevail in the
curricular marketplace. Similarly, it remains to be seen whether
public choice scholarship will take the pragmatic route we
recommend.
We believe that public choice does have something to contribute
to law schools. Both in terms of teaching and scholarship, public
choice may turn out to function in several different ways. It may
penetrate legal analysis only superficially, by contributing a few ba
sic concepts about interest group influence or vote cycling, which
legal academics can then invoke in their scholarship and pass on to
their students, probably using the episodic approach. But this ap
proach misses the opportunity to take advantage of the rich and
sophisticated work now being done by political scientists in the pub
lic choice mode.91 Another possibility is that legal scholars will
merely translate the findings of political scientists into recommen
dations for legal reform, using methodological courses to teach stu
dents how to "apply" public choice results to legal issues. Though
better than the first approach, we believe that this approach to
teaching and scholarship suffers from the opposite weakness, be
cause it limits the opportunities for legal academics to bring their
own expertise to bear on problems. In our opinion, the best,
although most difficult approach, is to try to integrate a fairly so
phisticated understanding of public choice with a nuanced apprecia
tion of the dynamics of the legal process. In the classroom, this
approach lends itself to trans-substantive use of public choice
materials; in scholarship, to a fruitful pragmatic melding of public
choice and legal analysis.92 But regardless of whether the reader
shares our view about the best approach to this kind of interdiscipli91. We highly recommend PERSPECTIVES ON Punuc CHOICE, supra note 6, as an accessi
ble but sophisticated survey of this body of learning.
92. The kind of work we have in mind is exemplified by the scholarship discussed supra in
section 11.B.
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nary venture, the Steams book will provide a valuable introduction
to efforts to apply public choice to public law.

